


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NSA review completed



Communist Violations of the Vietnam and Laos Settlement Agreements and Related Developments

DIA Review Completed.

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Fiftieth Report**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS***

(This report covers the week from
6 February through 12 February 1974)

The Key Points

- Troop infiltration moved briskly during the past week, with the detection of four new regular groups starting south. There also has been an unusually large number of personnel reported moving north through the system recently.
- Logistic activity in Indochina continued at a normal dry season pace during the week. Plans were noted for large cargo shipments to the Group 470 area during February.
- The Khmer Communists may be attempting to develop an air defense capability which in time could pose a threat to the Cambodian Air Force.
- Photography shows a new road segment in the eastern edge of Cambodia which is the last link in a 500-mile motorable corridor extending from North Vietnam to the COSVN area of South Vietnam.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

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Preface

This report is the fiftieth in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam and of other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

DETAILS

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

Personnel Infiltration

1. Four new regular groups, with a combined strength of nearly 2,500 troops, were detected last week starting the journey south from Vinh, North Vietnam. Three of them are destined for the COSVN area, while the fourth is bound for VC MR 5 in the coastal areas of southern GVN MR 1 and MR 2 -- the first group departing for this area since September 1973. The detection of the latter group may presage a resumption of infiltration to VC MR 5, which needs replacements and has had a low level of infiltration compared with last year's infiltration cycle (see the table below). In addition to troop infiltration, there were six new special-purpose groups with some 150 personnel identified in the system for the first time.

Comparative Starts of Troops from North Vietnam, by Destination 1 September - 12 February

	1972-73	1973-74
Total	77,000	50,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	19,500	2,000
MR 5	9,000	2,500
B-3 Front	14,000	5,500
COSVN	24,500	17,500
Southern Laos/MR 559	10,000	22,500

2. COMINT indicates that there has been an unusually large number of personnel, particularly sick and wounded, moving northward recently in the infiltration system. Since 1 January, more than 15,000 exfiltrators -- about 50% sick and wounded -- have exfiltrated northward and transited the Binh Tram (BT) 8 area at Vinh. Other exfiltrators include escort cadre who previously accompanied infiltrators south, personnel being sent to North Vietnam for training, and personnel on leave. The large number of sick and wounded may have resulted from the Communists' lowering of the medical criteria necessary for a soldier to return home -- permitting

a greater number of marginally sick and wounded to exfiltrate to North Vietnam. In past years, only seriously ill or permanently disabled personnel were sent back to North Vietnam.

Redeployments

3. Possibly in support of the planned increase in logistics activity during February (see paragraphs 6-9), two major elements of MR 559 -- Headquarters (Hqs.), Group 470 and Hqs., Group 471 -- relocated during the past two weeks. The Hqs., Group 471, has moved out of western South Vietnam into southern Laos about 35 miles southeast of Ban Bac along the dual-lane supply corridor. This relocation, which probably began in late January, may presage the movement of additional units and be intended to facilitate the large flow of cargo through the southern Group 472 area forecast for February. Similarly, the move of the Hqs., Group 470 from Pleiku Province, some 50 miles northward to a location near the Hqs., B-3 Front, in Kontum Province, may be to coordinate and distribute the February cargo deliveries. (See the transportation map.)

Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies


North Vietnam

4. Heavy dry season logistic activity is probably continuing in North Vietnam's Panhandle, although cargo shipments reflected in COMINT during the week were somewhat less than the previous week. During the period 6-8 February, for example, logistic units at Vinh reported handling only about 200 tons of ordnance. Several days later, on 11 February, some 200 tons of 37-mm antiaircraft artillery ammunition were sent along Route 7 for northern Laos.

5. Farther south, in the area between Quang Khe and the DMZ, a similar low level of activity was noted. Except for an 8 February intercept indicating the receipt of 1,300 cases of 57-mm antiaircraft ammunition and a 9 February shipment by barge of 140 tons of ordnance by logistics units near Dong Hoi, no other significant shipments were noted. A BT 26 element in the area, however, reported that on 10 February more than 2,200 tons of cargo, including nearly 1,800 tons of weapons, were in storage. This materiel will probably be shipped south in the near future.

Laos

6. Highlighting logistic developments in Laos this week were plans for a major transportation effort to move a large quantity of cargo during



February from southern Laos to Group 470 in the B-3 Front area of South Vietnam. The forecast, which was made by a Group 472 element in southern Laos in a 4 February conversation with the MR 559 Weapons Bureau, indicated that nearly 16,000 tons of materiel were to be transported through the Laotian Panhandle during the month, with some 12,500 tons destined for Group 470.

7. This effort is undoubtedly part of the spring "transportation offensive" predicted by logistics units in Laos for shortly after Tet. Although the type of cargo to be moved into the Group 470 area was not identified, the involvement of the MR 559 Weapons Bureau suggests that at least a portion of it is ordnance. Once the cargo arrives in South Vietnam, some will remain in the B-3 Front area, while a portion will probably be shipped south to the COSVN area.

8. The Communists are probably well on the way to fulfilling these plans. According to COMINT, about 3,000 tons were moved during the first four days of February alone. Moreover, COMINT and photography during the past week indicate that heavy traffic is continuing in the Laotian Panhandle. For example, on 5 and 6 February, elements of Group 472 reported handling more than 500 vehicles. Photography from Muong Nong to the tri-border area in Laos [] also confirmed this heavy movement, as some 100-200 trucks were seen moving daily during this period.

South Vietnam

9. In activity probably related to the scheduled supply shipments to Group 470 in South Vietnam during February, an unidentified rear services element of the NVA B-3 Front reported the receipt of some 60 tons of cargo on 7 February. The element also reported predictions of 15 to 18 vehicles per day for an unspecified period.

10. In other logistics developments, COMINT indicated the first planned call of a North Vietnamese tanker, the *Cuu Long*, in Quang Tri Province. On 2 February the probable petroleum pumping station T-55, located near Dong Hoi, was instructed by the general fuel corporation in Hanoi to offload the *Cuu Long* quickly so that it could continue to Dong Ha. The *Cuu Long* is a North Vietnamese 1,600-deadweight-ton tanker with a 16-foot draft. Because the draft of this tanker exceeds the estimated depth of the river at Dong Ha, the tanker will probably be lightered by coasters outside the mouth of the Cua Viet River.

II. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

Photography Indicates the Communists Now Have a Motorable Route Through the Western Highlands to the COSVN Area

11. Photography [] showed the completion of a 30-mile-long road through the eastern edge of Mondolkiri Province, Cambodia. The single-lane dirt road, completed some time after October 1973, is the last link in a series of new and recently restored road segments which together provide a 500-mile motorable corridor from North Vietnam through Laos and the western highlands of South Vietnam south into the COSVN area. []

it could not be determined how extensively the dual-lane road through the highlands area and the single-lane extension road to Route 14 in Cambodia are being used.

12. This unnumbered road branches off the new north-south dual-lane road (Communist Route 14) some ten miles north of the ARVN-controlled Duc Lap area and joins Cambodian Route 14, which leads south through a series of established Communist border base areas into Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces. It appears the new road was built as a temporary expedient to bypass Duc Lap and provide a linkup to NVA forces. Photography prior to last October had indicated that the new dual-lane road would pass through Duc Lap using existing Routes 6B and Q14 as a base. This plan apparently was scrapped, however, when the subsequent Communist drive against the Duc Lap and Bu Prang areas failed to push ARVN out of the area.

Khmer Communist Antiaircraft Capability

13. The Khmer Communists (KC) may be attempting to develop an air defense capability close to Phnom Penh which in time could pose a significant threat to the Cambodian Air Force. An intercepted message of early February indicates that the KC are making arrangements to distribute some 37-mm antiaircraft weapons and/or ammunition obtained from the North Vietnamese, in response to earlier requests from commanders in the southwestern part of the country. This is the first reference to North Vietnamese transfers of antiaircraft equipment to the KC. The KC already have a few 37-mm weapons captured earlier from FANK.

14. In the past, the KC have relied on small arms and machinegun fire -- with effective ranges not exceeding 3,000 feet -- to defend against air strikes. In contrast, the 37-mm weapon has an effective range of 8,200

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feet, and if competently manned would be very effective against the slow-moving helicopters and propeller-driven aircraft flown by the Cambodian Air Force. If these weapons are deployed, aircraft losses -- which have been minimal to date -- could rise sharply, and if Cambodian pilots are forced to attack from higher altitudes to avoid the fire, the impact of their support for ground operations might be substantially reduced.

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ANNEX

INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH

Since the signing of the cease-fire settlement for South Vietnam, some 112,000 North Vietnamese troops and specialists have infiltrated southward. About 87,000 of this total have started south since 27 January 1973, while the other 25,000 were moving in the pipeline on that date. Since 15 June 1973, when the original accord was reaffirmed, more than 61,000 troops and specialists have been sent south. The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting south, by month and destination, since 1 January 1973.

Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia
Since 1 January 1973¹

	COSVN	B-3 Front	MR 5	MR Tri- Thien-Hue	Southern Laos/ MR 559	Total
Total	30,500	11,000	9,500	14,000	26,500	91,500
1973						
Jan	7,000	5,000	4,000	2,500	18,500
Feb	5,000	500	1,500	1,000	8,000
Mar	1,000	1,000
Apr	1,000	1,000
May	7,000	7,000
Jun	1,500	1,500
Jul	3,000	3,000
Aug	1,500	1,500
Sep	2,000	2,000	3,000	7,000
Oct	14,000	14,000
Nov	1,000	1,000	5,500	7,500
Dec	3,500	1,000	4,500
1974						
Jan	10,000	3,000	13,000
Feb 1-12	3,000	500	500	4,000

1. Excludes special-purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.

Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

		MR 1	
VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²	VC/NVA	RVNAF
186,000	372,000	86,000	103,000
		325th	VNMC
		324B	Airborne
		304th	1st
		711th	2nd
		2nd ³	3rd
		673rd AAA	Regional Forces

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

3. Only one infantry regiment subordinate to the division.


MR 3

VC/NVA	RVNAF
38,000	94,000
9th	25th
7th	18th
5th	5th
77th AAA	Regional Forces
429th Sap Cmd	
69th Arty Cmd	

MR 4

VC/NVA	RVNAF
24,000	97,000

1st ³	21st
	9th
	7th
	Regional Forces



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